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A California resident is severely injured while vacationing in a
small Mexican resort. The airline that operates the only flight to
Los Angeles at the time of the accident refuses to fly the injured
person home, disregarding the serious condition and possible threat
to human life. In an action for wrongful death against the airline by
the spouse, one of the issues likely to be raised will be whether under
Mexican law punitive damages are recoverable.
Situations like this occur rather frequently, raising numerous
legal issues under foreign law. Although the preceding fact situation
may raise conflict of laws issues and issues under the Warsaw Con-
vention, 1 this article deals exclusively with the governing tort liability
and damages. In particular it focuses on "moral damages ' 2 under
Mexican law.
The geographical proximity between California and Mexico pro-
vides opportunities for commercial and non-commercial interaction
between citizens of Mexico and citizens of the United States. The
relationships thus created often involve legal issues that may eventu-
ally result in litigation. Conflict of laws issues are likely to arise and
application of foreign law is frequent, in spite of modern theories of
* J.D., 1964, University of Chile; J.D., 1980, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Califor-
nia. Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School.
** The author gratefully acknowledges Professor Harry Laughran's invaluable
suggestions and continuous support in the development of this article. The author is also
grateful to professors Michael Wolfson and Victor Gold for their comments in developing
,various drafts of this article. The writer wishes to thank her research assistants Mary Ann
Morrison and Carmen Castello for their contributions in the preparation of this article.
1. The Warsaw Convention, formally titled Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, was created on October 12, 1929, and
was adhered to by the United States on June 15, 1934. The official text of the treaty is in
French and is published at 49 Stat. 3000 (1934). An English translation is published at 49 Stat.
3014 (1934) and reprinted in T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 and 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1976).
For a comprehensive comment, see Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967).
2. Moral damages are damages that can be recovered for a non-pecuniary or non-mate-
rial loss or injury. See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
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interest analysis. 3 Therefore, the California practitioner benefits from
a basic knowledge of civil law and Mexican law.
While Mexico and the United States are geographically close, so-
cially and culturally they are light years apart. Mexico is part of the
third world. The differences between the United States and Mexico
have many significant implications on legal relations between Mexi-
cans and Americans who visit Mexico. For example, because many
Americans do not realize the hazards of life and business in Mexico,
they cannot anticipate potential problems. Once such problems are
encountered Americans may misjudge what Mexican law can and will
do for them. Americans tend to assume that the moral principles and
value hierarchy that govern life in the United States also govern the
lives of people everywhere. This ethnocentric view of the world
presents a great problem when Americans have dealings in Mexico.
The law of punitive damages is one of the best illustrations of the
diverging values and expectations concerning the law between Mexico
and the United States. This article will show that while the concept of
moral damages under Mexican law has nothing to do with the notion
of punitive damages present in American jurisprudence, it is similar
to the United States' practice of awarding damages for emotional
distress.
Since Mexico is a civil law, rather than a common law country,
Section II will discuss fundamental civil law concepts, including a
brief discussion of torts and damages. Section III will explore basic
theories of tort liability according to Mexican law, and deals with the
notion of moral damages in Mexico and applies this concept to spe-
cific fact situations. Section IV discusses the relationship between
moral damages in Mexico and the United States' practice of awarding
damages for emotional distress.4
3. Professor Brainard Currie developed the "governmental interest analysis approach"
to choice of law. This approach examines the policies expressed in the respective laws that
may govern a case and the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states to
assert an interest in the application of these policies. If after going through the analysis that
Currie suggests, a court finds that a conflict between the legitimate interests of the two states is
unavoidable, it should apply forum law. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1963). However, in a recent case between a California grower and a
United States corporation the California Supreme Court held that Mexican law rather than
California law should apply. Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 39 Cal. 3d 126 (1985). In Wong the
California grower was conducting farming operations in Mexico that were illegal under a Mex-
ican law which prohibited foreign ownership and control of farming operations. He sued the
United States corporation for anticipatory damages for breach of a marketing agreement con-
cerning crops grown in Mexico. Id.
4. Civil law and common law evolved from different sources and in different ways.
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II. BASIC CIVIL LAW CONCEPTS RELATING TO TORT LIABILITY
AND DAMAGES
A. Fundamentals of Civil Law
The term "civil law" originated from the latin words jus civile,
the law of the civitas. Civitas was a Roman city where only Roman
citizens or cives could assert legal rights and privileges under the Ro-
man law.5 The ius gentium, "principles of law. . . common to man-
kind (gentes) applied to all other free inhabitants of the Roman
Empire."
6
The system of civil law is commonly believed to have originated
at the time of the publication of the Law of the XII Tables in Rome in
450 B.C. Today, civil law is the dominant body of law throughout
most of Western Europe, all of Central and South America, many
parts of Asia and Africa, and even in a few enclaves in common law
countries. For example, the United States is a common law country,
but Louisiana and Puerto Rico are civil law jurisdictions. Similarly,
though Canada is a common law country, Quebec is a civil law
jurisdiction.
7
The term "civil law" refers to the Roman law as set forth in the
Justinian Code in the 6th Century A.D.8 as reinterpreted by the
There are terms like "tort" in common law and "fault" in civil law that cannot be translated
from one legal system into the other because the concepts themselves are different. Therefore,
an effort is made to provide the reader with a basic explanation as to the meaning of unfamiliar
terms. To aid in the understanding of the paper, the author uses some conventional terms with
a given meaning. For example, instead of talking about civil delicts and quasi delicts which
together are the closest equivalent in civil law to the common law "tort," the word "civil tort"
is employed. Each term is defined in the section in which it appears.
5. Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law. Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 419, 420 (1967).
6. The ius gentium may be defined as the universal element, in antithesis to the
national peculiarities (ius civile), to be found in the positive law of every state ...
In a practical sense ius gentium covered only those rules, institutions and principles
of actual Roman Law which, owing to their simplicity and correspondence with the
general practice of mankind, were applied to cives and peregrini indifferently, the ius
civile describing, in this antithesis, those not so extended.
F. DE ZULUETA, THE SCIENCE OF LAW IN THE LEGACY OF ROME 201-02 (1962).
7. J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND
LATIN-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (1978).
8. Roman law was the law of the Roman citizens from 450 B.C., the date of the publica-
tion of the Law of the Twelve Tables, until 565 A.D., the date of the death of the emperor
Justinian. This emperor codified the existing Roman law, including his own legislative enact-
ments in a monumental work, The Corpus Juris Civilis. With the fall of the Roman Empire,
The Corpus Juris Civilis fell into disuse and systems of Roman Vulgar Law (Roman law in a
cruder version) took its place together with Germanic legal customs as the law of the peoples
settling in Western Europe. In the 11th century, with the founding of the University of
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Glossators, Commentators, Humanists and Natural Law exponents,
and ultimately recodified in the nineteenth century. 9 Modem civil
law has also been influenced by Canon Law and Germanic customary
law. '0
There are three fundamental differences between civil law and
common law: (1) the sources of law; (2) the role of the judge; and (3)
the nature of the proceedings.
In a civil law system the primary source of law is codified legisla-
tion, whereas a common law system relies primarily on stare decisis,
or case law. Civil law codes usually differ from common law statutes
in the following ways:
A [civil law] code is not a list of special rules for particular situa-
tions; it is rather, a body of general principles carefully arranged
and closely integrated. A [civil law] Code achieves the highest
level of generalization based upon a scientific structure of classifi-
cation. A [civil law] Code purports to be comprehensive and to
Bologna, The Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian was not only the subject matter of legal educa-
tion, but it became the law of the Holy Roman Empire. The law courses at Bologna attracted
students from all over Europe. These students in turn, applied Roman law in their own coun-
tries. New universities were founded in the image of Bologna and, so, Roman law became the
ius commune (the common law) of Western Europe.
There were different opinions as to the right way of approaching the study of Justinian's
The Corpus Juris Civilis and so, Glossators, Post Glossators, Humanists, Natural Law expo-
nents and scholars of the Historical school all left their mark in this system of law. With the
growth of the concept of nation and sovereignty in the 15th Century, the idea of ius commune
faded and Roman law was "received," that is incorporated as a binding body of law in the
national law of each country. Eventually, in the 19th Century the principal states of Western
Europe enacted civil codes (and other codes) of which the French Civil Code of 1804 is the
archetype. Id. at 72-73.
The subject matter of these civil codes was almost identical with the subject
matter of the first three books of the Institutes of Justinian and the ius commune of
medieval Europe. . . . A European or Latin American [Mexican] civil code of to-
day clearly demonstrates the influence of the Roman law and its medieval revival.
Id. at 73.
The French Civil Code together with its legal institutions and scholarship has influenced a
majority of civil law countries. The armies of Napoleon carried French law throughout Eu-
rope and later this influence took place under French Colonialism. When the Spanish Empire
in Latin America dissolved in the 19th Century, it was to the French Civil Code that the law
makers of the new nations turned for inspiration. The French Civil Code remains in effect to
this day with revisions, inter alia, in the Spanish Civil Code of 1888. M. GLENDON, M.
GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS. TEXT, MATERIALS AND
CASES 55 (1985). Thus, mentions to the French Civil Code and to French scholarship are
frequent in this paper.
9. Schiller, The Nature and Significance of Jurists Law, 47 B.U.L. REV. 20, 37-38
(1967).
10. For a very good study of the influence of Roman Law on Western law see P. Kos-
CHAKER, EUROPA UND DAS ROMISCHE RECHT (1947).
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encompass the entire subject matter, not in the details but in the
principles, and to provide answers for questions which may arise. I'
Common law statutes do not maintain the same level of general-
ity as civil law codes do, nor do they purport to be all embracing.
They do not have the conceptual and terminological consistency
found in the codes. The legislature resorts to statutes to respond to
current particularized needs, i.e., rent control, environmental regula-
tion, labor practices, etc. Statutes outside of the codes are more easily
amended and, therefore, more appropriate as circumstances change.
Civil law codes tend to be more general and encompass a broader
range of circumstances than do common law statutes. In civil law,
legal scholars' views and treatises are treated as a primary source of
law, while in common law the legal scholars' views are given less
weight. In spite of the differences between common law and civil law,
the growing importance of case decisions in civil law and the greater
tendency to rely on statutes in common law has begun to create an
area of convergence between common law and civil law. 12
The role of the judge in civil law differs from the role of the judge
in common law. This is due in part to the difference in the source of
law between the two systems. Civil law judges must apply codified
law by means of a process of deduction, in which general codified
principles are applied to a specific case before the judge.' 3 For in-
stance, in an action for wrongful death brought in a French court, a
judge must look at the specific fact situation and decide whether there
is a tort which is actionable under section 138214 of the French Civil
Code. 15
Civil law codes attempt to cover a wide range of unforeseen fact
situations by way of substantive provisions of utmost generality and
11. Dainow, supra note 5, at 424.
12. For a good analysis of the role of statutes in modem civil law and common law, see
Glendon, The Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV., 663, 668-69
(1984).
13. For a good discussion of the role of a judge in civil matters in France, see Perrot, The
Judge: The Extent and Limit of His Role in Civil Matters, 50 TUL. L. REV. 495 (1976).
14. In France and most civil law countries including Mexico, the code sections are num-
bered using the term article or articulo. These terms have been translated into English as
"articles" or "sections." Since the term "article" is more appropriate for use in constitutional
and international law, for the purposes of this paper, the word "section" will be used where
referring to the codes.
15. CIVIL CODE [C. CIV.] § 1382 (amended July 1, 1976) (J. Crabb trans. 1976) (Fr.).
Section 1382 is the most important statute on tort liability in French law. In very general
terms it provides that: "Any act whatever of man which causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it occurred to make reparation." Id.
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flexibility. These so called "general clauses" of the codes may pro-
vide, for example, that all immoral transactions are void or that every
obligation must be performed in good faith. 16 Thus, in an action for
damage of goods in a civil law country which has not enacted anti-
trust legislation, an exclusion of liability clause in a contract will most
likely be considered immoral or contra bonos mores,17 and the judge
will declare the exclusion clause void and find for the plaintiff.18
If there are gaps or lacunae in the code (that is, there are no
statutes which specifically pertain to the particular case), the judge
must nevertheless decide the case, either by use of general clauses, by
analogy, or by applying general principles of law. A judge cannot
refuse to decide a case simply because there is no applicable law gov-
erning the case. 19
For example, the French legislature in 1804 did not envision lia-
bility for automobile accidents. The only code section that by analogy
could be said to apply to automobiles was section 1384 of the Civil
16. Section 242 German Civil Code: "The obligor is bound to perform the obligation in
such a way as is required by the principles of bona fides with due regard to existing usage."
The CIVIL CODE. [C. CIV.] § 242 (amended Jan. 1, 1976) (W. Ger.) (. Forrester, S. Goren &
H. Ilgen trans. 1976). The German Civil Code enacted in 1896 and in effect as of January 1,
1900 as amended, remains the law of the German Federal Republic (West Germany). All
references to the German Civil Code in this paper refer to the 1896 (West German) Code as
amended.
17. Section 138 Subdivision (1) German Civil Code: "A jural act which is contra bonos
mores (violative of the commands of morality) is void." C. civ. § 138 SUB. I (amended Jan. 1,
1976) (W. Ger.) (. Forrester, S. Goren & H. Ilgen trans. 1976).
18. Many civil law countries use contra bonos mores (against good morals or against good
customs or simply immoral) as a "general clause" that allows a judge great flexibility in decid-
ing whether a particular conduct is immoral and, therefore, becomes a basis of liability. For
example, Section 1133 of the French Civil Code states: "A causa is illicit when it is prohibited
by law, or when it is contrary to morality or public policy." C. av. § 1133 (amended July,
1976) (Fr.) (. Crabb trans. 1976). The same idea is reflected in Section 1910 of the Mexican
Civil Code: "He who acting illegally or against good customs causes damage to another, is
obliged to repair it, unless he proves that the damage occurred in consequence of the fault or
inexcusable negligence of the victim." (M. Gordon trans. 1980). Mexico, like the United
States, is a Federal Republic with twenty nine states, two territories and a federal district like
the District of Columbia. All references to the Mexican Civil Code in this paper are directed
to the Civil Code for the Federal District and Territories, promulgated August 30, 1928, effec-
tive October 1, 1932. This Code has served as a model to the civil code of the individual states
and is also used as a "back up" code for interpreting federal case law. See Butte, Strict Liabil-
ity in Mexico, 18 AM. J. CoMp. L. 805 n.2 (1970).
19. "The judge who refuses to judge, on pretext of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the law, may be prosecuted as guilty of a denial of justice." C. civ. 4 (amended July 1,
1976) (J. Crabb trans 1976) (Fr.). "The silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law do not
authorize the judges or courts to refrain from deciding a controversy." Mexican Civil Code
18. (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
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Code which states: "[e]veryone is responsible not only for the dam-
ages caused by his own acts, but also for damage caused by acts of
persons for whom he must answer or by objects in his custody."' 20 In
1930 the highest French court (Cour de Cassation) decided that this
section established an independent basis of liability and that the custo-
dian (owner or driver) of an automobile (or other instrumentality)
which causes an accident, is presumptively liable. 21
The preliminary titles of most civil codes, with the exception of
the German Code, contain directions on interpretation and applica-
tion of the code.22 The codes normally order judges to base their deci-
sions on specific code sections. 23 Normally, a judge may not base his/
her decision on prior case law. To do so would convert a prior judi-
cial decision into a "general rule of conduct" 24 (stare decisis), which is
not normally permitted in a civil law system.
Civil law judges must cite at least one statutory provision as a
basis for their decision. A decision based solely on case precedent will
be reversed for "lack of legal basis."' 25 However, in some civil law
countries, including Mexico, a court decision may become law. This
occurs when a particular legal issue is decided by the highest court,
or another specified tribunal, in an appreciable number of cases. The
uniform judicial decisions become juris prudence constante or juris-
prudencia (Mexico), which may become binding law in future cases.
Resort to jurisprudence constante is particularly helpful in situations
where there are very few legislative provisions, as in France in con-
20. C. civ. § 1384 (J. Crabb trans. 1976) (Fr.).
21. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 514-15 (4th ed.
1980).
22. "When there is no law exactly applicable to the point in controversy, the customs of
the place shall be observed, and in the absence thereof, the general principles of law." Spanish
Civil Code § 6, quoted in id. at 228. "Juridical controversies of a civil nature shall be decided
in accordance with the letter of the law or its juridical interpretation. In the absence of a law,
they shall be decided in accordance with general legal principles." Mexican Civil Code § 19
(M. Gordon trans. 1980).
23. "Judges are forbidden to pronounce decisions by way of general and regulative dispo-
sition on causes which are submitted to them." C. civ. § 5 (J. Crabb trans. 1976) (Fr.). A
judge who violates this prohibition is, theoretically, guilty of a criminal offense. CODE PENAL
[C. PEN.] 127 (Fr.) quoted in R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 21, at 578.
24. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 21, at 578.
25. The traditional style of French decisions has historical roots. After the Revolution of
1789, the French people deeply distrusted judges because of the experiences under the royal
regime. Also, Montesquieu had proclaimed the doctrine of separation of powers and only the
legislature could make law in a general way. H. CAPITANT, LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JU-
RISPRUDENCE CIVILE (7th ed. 1976) reprinted in H. LIEBESNY, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS, A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 56-59 (4th ed. 1981).
1986]
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nection with tort liability.26
The final difference between civil law and common law is found
in the nature of the judicial proceeding. In civil law there is neither a
"trial," nor a jury. The civil law system prefers documentary evi-
dence over witness testimony, with the latter receiving very little
weight. 27 In addition, in a civil law court, only the judge cross-exam-
ines witnesses. Civil court proceedings consist of a series of isolated
hearings. Further, there is no formal pre-trial discovery.
B. The Concept of Tort in Civil Law
In order to comprehend the notion of tort liability under Mexi-
can law, and in particular, moral damages, a brief explanation of the
civil law counterpart of common law tort liability is necessary. The
statements that follow refer to the civil law in general. The basic prin-
ciples of civil law tort liability apply to Mexican law. Any general
differences between Mexican law and civil law will also be discussed
below.
There is no equivalent civil law term for the common law term
"tort." The common law term "tort" is extremely difficult to trans-
late into civil law terminology because of the fundamental division of
civil law into "public law" and "private law."'28 As a consequence of
this division, tort liability belongs to the category of private law and is
part of the law of obligation or a source of an obligation. 29 The law of
26. It is interesting to observe that out of a total of 2283 sections in the French Civil
Code, only five (1382-86) are devoted to what the common law calls tort liability. Most of the
French law on this subject was developed by the French highest court, the Cour de cassation,
acting very much like a Common Law court. Tunc, The Twentieth Century Development and
Function of the Law of Torts in France, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1089, 1091 (1965).
27. Documentary evidence is similar to common law "writings" which are one category
of demonstrative evidence. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 524 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
28. Roman law and continental European legal doctrine and its offspring divide all law
into public law and private law. Public law is understood to be that body of law which governs
the affairs of the community (state, municipalities, etc.). Private law regulates such legal rela-
tions in which persons (without any display of authority, that is, on the basis of equality) stand
against each other as individuals. M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 22 (R. Sannenberg &
Butterworths trans. 1965).
29. An obligation is a bond by which the one party is bound to perform and the other
entitled to receive some act or forbearance. The term obligatio sometimes denotes the right,
oftentimes the duty, but more properly it denotes the whole relationship. B. NICHOLAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 158 (1962). This concept of obligation is derived from the
Roman Law as found in Digest 44.7.1 and Inst. 3, 13.2. (These references are to the Digest and
the Institutes which comprise two parts of Justinian's The Corpus Juris Civilis. See supra note
8). The other two parts are the Code and the Novels. Id. For a good summary of Roman
sources and explanations as to their conventional citation, see A. SCHILLER, ROMAN LAW
242 [Vol. 8:235
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obligations covers all acts or situations which can give rise to rights or
claims and is customarily divided into three parts: the law of con-
tracts, the law of torts, and the law of unjust enrichment.
30
There are two civil law terms which relate to the common law
concept of tort. They are delict and quasi-delict.31 These terms apply
to both criminal and civil causes of action. Penal delicts and penal
quasi-delicts are governed exclusively by the penal codes and therefore
are not pertinent to this discussion of tort liability.
The terms civil delict and civil quasi-delict parallel the common
law notions of intentional and negligent tort.32 Generally, a delict is
an unlawful or illicit act committed with intent to harm and a quasi-
delict is an unlawful or illicit act committed without intent to harm.
33
In civil law there are no torts, there is only a law of tort.34 This
means that in civil law there are no specific torts such as false impris-
onment, assault or battery. Section 1382 of the French Civil Code is
a good example of a civil law code concerning the law of tort. It
provides: "Any act whatever of man which causes aamage to another
obliges him by whose fault it occurred to make reparation. 35 The
section is drafted in a very general manner. There are no specific torts
and therefore even the distinction between negligent and intentional
torts becomes irrelevant. The only distinction among the different
theories of liability is reflected in the amount of damages awarded.
chapter 11 (1978). The situations that give rise to an obligation according to the Romans were
contracts, quasi contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts. Inst. 3, 27, 4, 5 respectively.
30. "The distinction between contractual and delictual (tort) responsibility has been
treated as fundamental in civil law theory, even though both contract and delict are regarded
as parts of the single field of obligations." M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, supra
note 8, at 262.
31. As an example, one person may have a claim against another because he or she gave a
sum of money to another as a loan. This claim arises from a contract. A person may also have
a claim against another because someone wrongfully damaged a thing belonging to that per-
son. This claim against the wrongdoer arises from the delict. Today, this would be a claim for
damages. M. KASER, supra note 28, at 135.
32. The term "civil tort" will be used in this paper to refer to civil law torts, that is civil
delicts and civil quasi-delicts (intentional and negligent tort).
33. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 577 n.44 (2d ed. 1977).
34. Speaking of French law, Tunc says: "We have no specific torts. We have a general
law of tort, based on the general principles of Articles 1382 and 1383." Tunc, supra note 26, at
1091. The use of the word in the singular is deliberate. "The common law knows not tort but
torts-a bag of nuts and bolts." Catala & Weir, Delicts and Torts: A Study in Parallel Part I,
37 TUL. L. REV. 573, 580 (1963). "The French law of tort is essentially judicial application of
five articles of the civil code. In contrast, the common law systems know not contracts, but
contract." H. DE VRIES, CIVIL LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAWYER 367 (1973).
35. C. ciV. § 1382 (J. Crabb trans.) (Fr.).
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Tort law in most civil law countries, including Mexico, is founded on
sections 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code.
36
Sections 1382 and 1383 are derived from the famous Lex Aquilia
enacted by the Romans in 286 B.C. 37 The Lex Aquilia with its exten-
sions provided the most comprehensive and important tort remedy
available in Roman law. A brief look at the Roman notion of "tort"
is necessary to understand the modem civil tort.
Roman law was also divided into public and private law.38 Con-
sequently, the Romans distinguished between crimes against the com-
munity or state, called crimina publica and wrongs against the
individual, his family or his property, called delicta privata. Crimina
publica were litigated by the state and typically involved treason and
assaults on government officials. The delicta privata, from which to-
day's civil law concepts of delict and quasi-delict originated, could be
litigated in a private suit only by the victim. The wrongdoer was
treated as the debtor of the victim, which meant that the victim was
entitled to a sum of money from the wrongdoer. Thus, the Roman
law delict action gave rise to an obligation to pay a sum of money
(poena)39 to the victim, in addition to any other damages awarded to
the victim.40
For example, delictal actions were classified as penal (actio ex
36. "Any act whatever of man which causes damage to another obliges him by whose
fault it occurred to make reparation." C. civ. § 1382 (J. Crabb trans.) (Fr.). "Everyone is
responsible for the damage he causes, not only by his act, but also by his negligence or his
imprudence." Id. at § 1383.
37. The Lex Aquilia allegedly of 286 B.C. was voted as a plebiscite, that is by the con-
silium plebis, the assembly of the Plebeians. Initially it would only have been enforced
amongst the Plebeians, but in the same year the Lex Hortensia was passed and it gave plebi-
scites general force of law over Patricians and Plebeians alike. JORS & KUNKEL, DERECHO
PRIVADo ROMANO, 364-65 (1965). The text of the Lex Aquilia as extended by the Praetor
(the Roman magistrate in charge of judicial affairs) and with the comments of the jurists is
found in Digest, 2, 1-11. See supra note 29.
38. See supra note 28.
39. The poena (punishment) is pecuniary and its purpose is to benefit the victim. This is
a residue of the primitive concept that the sanction for every wrong was private vengeance
from which the wrongdoer could not escape unless the victim or his family would accept
ransom money. That the punishment was a sum of money and that the cause of action be-
longed to the victim does not prevent it from being primarily a way of inflicting punishment.
V. ARANGIo-Ruiz, LAS ACCIONES EN EL DERECHO PRIVADO ROMANO 127-28 (1945). The
same line of thought is found in W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON
LAW 344 (1952).
40. B. NICHOLAS, supra note 29, at 210. R. MONIER, MANUEL DE DROIT ROMAIN.
LES OBLIGATIONS 38 (1954).
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delicto).41 In contrast, all other private law actions, whether in rem 4 2
or in personam,43 were classified as compensatory actions (reipersecu-
tory or ad rem persequendam).4 One of the delicta privata was theft
(furtum), and the appropriate action for theft was the actio furti, a
penal action. It allowed for the recovery of double, triple, or quadru-
ple the value of the stolen thing according to certain distinctions in
the law. If the stolen thing was in the hands of a third party, the
victim could use the actio furti as rei persequendam to recover the
stolen property or its value.
45
Unlike civil law today, Roman law did not use the terms delict
and quasi-delict to distinguish between intentional and negligent ac-
tions. However, the terms delict and quasi-delict did exist in Roman
law. In Roman law, delict referred to four fact patterns which consti-
tuted a private offense. These four private law delicts (delicta privata)
were: (1) theft (furtum), (2) robbery (rapina), (3) damage unlawfully
caused (danum iniuria datum), and (4) insult (iniuria).46 A delict in
Roman law could consist of either intentional or negligent conduct.
There were also only four fact situations which comprised the
Roman law quasi-delict. These were: (1) judicial acts contrary to the
law (iudex, qui litem suam fecerit); (2) things thrown or poured into
the street from a dwelling (directum vel effusum); (3) something
placed on, or suspended from, a building which fell and injured some-
one (positum vel suspensum); and (4) loss to a customer by thievery or
by damaging the customer's property caused by an innkeeper's assist-
ants (nauta, caupo and stabularius).47 Thus, Roman law quasi-delicts
could consist of either intentional or negligent conduct. Furthermore,
the last three situations actually gave rise to actions based on what the
common law would consider strict liability. The criteria for catego-
rizing the aforementioned fact patterns as either delicts or quasi-de-
licts remains unclear.
41. Examples of these actiones delicto are: actio furti (theft), actio iniurarum (bodily in-
jury and insult to person). B. NICHOLAS, supra note 29.
42. Typical actions in rem were reivindicatio (protection of property) and vindicatio servi-
tutis (protection of easement). Id.
43. Frequently used actions in personam were actio certae creditae pecuniae (recovery of
money loaned) and actio venditi (action of the seller to obtain payment for the thing sold). Id.
44. "A rei persecutory action commonly results in the payment of compensation, and a
penal action in the payment of more than compensation, but the essential distinction is to be
found in the punitive or vindicative character of the penal action." Id. at 210.
45. Id. at 212-13.
46. Gaius, Institutes 3, 182. See supra note 29 for reference to Roman sources.
47. Digest 44.7.5; Inst. 4, 5. See supra note 29.
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The concept of fault or culpa, the cornerstone of civil tort liabil-
ity, originated from the Lex Aquilia which introduced extra-contrac-
tual fault 48 for the first time (although the concept of fault existed in
contract actions prior to the Lex Aquilia). The Lex Aquilia essentially
made the defendant liable for damages if the defendant acted iniuria,
that is, non iure or without a right. 49 The Roman law concept of
"fault" was referred to as Aquilian or delictal in order to differentiate
it from contractual fault. Aquilian or delictal fault formed the basis of
French civil tort liability5° which in turn formed the basis of Mexican
civil tort liability.
The French Civil Code does not define fault. However, section
1382 of the French Civil Code alludes to the concept of fault. Section
1382 provides that: "[a]ny act whatever of man which causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it occurred to make repara-
tion."5 The French scholar Toullier, stated that:
The true meaning of our article 1382 is, therefore, that one who
causes damage to another by doing something which he does not
have the right to do or by neglecting to do what he ought to do, is
obligated to make reparation for the damage that has occurred
through his fault.
52
In common law terms, French civil law "fault" exists when there
is a breach of a duty of care. Modern civil law scholars Von Mehren
and Gordley stated that "besides duties imposed by the criminal law
and by specific texts from the civil or other codes, it [French civil law
"duty of care"] includes a general duty not to act in such a way as to
injure others. '5 3
This duty of care is owed to all the world and therefore the de-
48. It originated in actions not involving a contract.
49. "To act without a right came to mean to act with dolus or culpa, that is, willfully or
negligently." A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 33, at 567.
50. OURLIAC ET MALAFOSSE, L'HISTOIRE Du DROIT PRIVE. LEs OBLIGATIONS 375
(1961).
51. The French Civil Code merges the delict and quasi-delict under the generic term
"fault." "The idea of fault includes all; it is the unjustified injury which gives rise to the
obligation to indemnify; it matters little in what manner the injury was caused." 2 PLANIOL,
TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE Du DROIT CIVIL 442, Part I, No. 827 (Louisiana State Law Institute
trans. 1959).
52. Toullier, Le Droit Francais, in A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 33, at
576.
53. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 33, at 581. The well-known contempo-
rary French scholar Andr6 Tunc uses the same language: "The duty of care is owed not to
certain people or to certain circles of people. It is a general duty to the public at large." Tunc,
supra note 26, at 1091.
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fendant will almost always be found at fault with respect to
someone. 5
4
C. "Damages" in Civil Law
In order to understand the notion of "moral damages" in Mexi-
can law, it is important to understand the civil law concept of dam-
ages. The term "damages" is often used to refer to two distinct
concepts: "injury," which constitutes grounds for a suit, and "recov-
ery," what the court awards to the plaintiff. To avoid confusion, the
words "damage" and "damages" will be used herein to refer to the
civil law injury, loss, or violation of rights suffered by the plaintiff.
The term "recovery" will be used, instead of "damages," to denote
the civil law recovery awarded by the court to the plaintiff.
Most civil law scholars define damage as any loss of a person's
"patrimony. ' '55 The word "patrimony" is a term of art which, like
many other civil law terms, does not have an equivalent term in com-
mon law. 56 There is some disagreement as to the definition of patri-
mony. Some scholars define patrimony as the totality of a person's
legal rights and assets 57 which include: (1) real and personal property
(referred to in civil law as "material" property), and (2) rights (re-
ferred to in civil law as "moral rights" or "rights of personality").
"Rights" include such things as the right to be free from emotional
distress, the right to maintain and protect one's honor and reputation,
and rights comparable to those espoused in the United States Consti-
tution Bill of Rights.
Some civil law scholars who disagree with the view that patri-
mony consists of both material property and moral rights58 define pat-
rimony as consisting of only the totality of a person's personal
property and real property rights ("material" property). These schol-
ars use the term "extra-patrimony" to refer to the totality of one's
moral rights.
54. Id.
55. R. ROjINA VILLEGAS, DERECHO CIVIL MEXICANO 117 (3d ed. 1976); E. GUTIER-
REZ Y GONZALEZ, DERECHO DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 640 (5th ed. 1974).
56. The term patrimony is a legal fiction which is separate and independent from its
individual components. In a sense, the notion of patrimony is similar to the common law
concept of a corporation which is a legal fiction independent from its individual shareholders.
57. E. GUTIERREZ Y GONZALEZ, supra note 55, at 642.
58. M. BORJA SORIANO, TEORIA GENERAL DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 427 (7th ed. 1971).
See also PLANIOL, supra note 51, at 471.
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D. Moral Damages in Civil Law
Most civil law scholars define moral damage in a negative sense
as any loss which does not affect material property. 59 More accu-
rately, moral damage is a loss to the "rights of personality" (droits de
la personalite), or moral rights, which involve an affront to one's
honor, reputation, feelings, emotions, or peace of mind.60
Civil law scholars classify moral damages into three categories.
These are: (a) injuries involving social concerns, such as one's honor,
prestige, or reputation in the community; (b) injuries involving a per-
son's feelings (similar to common law emotional distress and pain and
suffering injuries); and (c) physical injuries which have an emotional
impact on the victim (such as scars, disfiguration and the like, which
might not involve physical disability, but cause emotional distress). 6'
Material damage, unlike moral damage, occurs when there is loss or
injury to one's real or personal property ("material" property).
Civil law scholars are in disagreement as to whether the courts
should award recovery for moral damages. Civil law scholars can be
divided into three groups on this point: (1) those who do not believe
there should be any recovery at all for moral damages; (2) those who
believe there should be recovery for moral damages only if there is
proof of material damage; and (3) those who believe that there should
be recovery for moral damages even if there is no proof of material
damage. The argument of the first group of scholars against awarding
any recovery for moral damages is similar to common law arguments
that negligent infliction of emotional distress should not be an in-
dependent cause of action due to the difficulty of measuring and prov-
ing loss, and the likelihood of abuse. The second group of scholars
would require, for example, that moral damage recovery be awarded
to a widow for the wrongful death of her deceased husband only if the
widow established that she had been financially dependent upon her
husband and that her relationship (marriage) with her husband prior
to his death was sanctioned by law. Finally, the third group would
permit recovery for the interference with a person's religious or patri-
otic feelings and beliefs. 62
59. R. BREBBIA, EL DANO MORAL 75 (1967); M. BORJA SORIANO, supra note 58; Y.
AVILA RAMIREZ, LA REPARACION DEL DANO MORAL 30-34 (1960).
60. R. ROJINA VILLEGAS, supra note 55, at 128.
61. M. BORJA SORIANO, supra note 58, at 427.
62. The following discuss all three scholarly arguments: PLANIOL, supra note 51, at 471;
R. TOULEMON & J. MOORE, LE PREJUDICE CORPOREL ET MORAL EN DROIT COMMUN. 135
(3d ed. 1968); Catala & Weir, Delicts and Torts: A Study in Parallel Part III, 39 TUL. L.R. 663,
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French courts previously adhered to the view that there should
not be any recovery for moral damages. French courts would not
allow recovery unless the loss or injury constituted material damage,
and could be measured in monetary terms. Since moral damages con-
sist of violations of moral rights, such as the right to free exercise of
religion, the French courts would not grant recovery because of the
difficulty of putting a price tag on such damage. Therefore, French
courts only permitted recovery for loss to one's "material" property.
Recently, the French courts adopted the third view and began award-
ing recovery for moral damages without requiring proof of material
damage.63 However, the majority of civil law jurisdictions still follow
the second view and allow recovery for moral damage only if there is
proof of material damage.
Civil law scholars are well aware of the difficulty of putting a
price tag on moral damage injuries. Under the French Civil Code,
determination of awards for moral damages is extremely subjective
because there are no specific code guidelines or limitations. French
Civil Code" section 1382 simply requires the wrongdoer "to make
reparation. '65 French scholars, acutely aware of the subjective, vague
nature of the French Civil Code's provision for awarding moral dam-
ages recovery, often facetiously quote French writer Anatole France's
statement that "justice is giving each one his due: to the wealthy, his
wealth and to the poor, his poverty."'6
6
III. TORT LIABILITY AND RECOVERY UNDER MEXICAN LAW
A. General Theories of Tort Liability
An overview of the fundamental concepts of tort liability under
701 (1964). E. GUTIERREZ Y GONZALEZ, supra note 55, at 646-49;M. BORJA SORIANO, supra
note 58, at 428-30; A.M. VERA CID, EL DANO MORAL 37-42 (1966); and Y. AVILA RAMIREZ,
supra note 59, at 37.
63. This change of attitude is clearly noticed by Toulemon and Moore when they say:
"La jurisprudence, a fini par admettre le prejudice sentimental sans aucun alliage de dommage
pecuniare et pour ainsi dire a l'etat pur." Judicial decisions have finally accepted the idea of
sentimental (non-pecuniary) damage without any relationship to a finding of material damage,
in a pure state, so to speak (translation by the author). R. TOULEMON & J. MOORE, supra note
62, at 138.
64. See supra text accompanying note 15.
65. In the words of Touleman and Moore, "le judge lorsqu'il applique Particle 1382 a
pour fonction, non de punir lafaute, mais d'ordonner la reparation du dommage. Le Prejudice
Corporel et Moral," R. TOULEMAN & J. MOORE, supra note 62, at 115. The judge in applying
Section 1382 has the task, not of punishing the negligent act, but of decreeing the reparation
of the damage that has been caused (translation by the author).
66. R. TOULEMON & J. MOORE, supra note 62, at 119.
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Mexican law will assist in the comparison of Mexican moral damages
with the common law notion of punitive damages. The fundamental
basis of tort liability in Mexican law, as in French law, is the occur-
rence of an unlawful or illicit act causing injury which necessitates
reparation. This is known as the "subjective" theory of tort liability
which is based on fault (culpa). Section 1910 of the Mexican Civil
Code sets forth the obligation to repair and reads as follows: "[h]e
who acting illegally or against good customs, causes damage to an-
other, is obliged to repair it unless he proves that the damage oc-
curred in consequence of the fault or inexcusable negligence of the
victim." 
67
This section, like section 1382 of the French Civil Code, bases
civil tort liability squarely on fault. 68 The term "illegally" in section
1910 refers to illegal conduct, whether intentional (dolosa) or negli-
gent (culposa). Although today's civil law term delict refers to inten-
tional conduct and quasi-delict refers to negligent conduct, under
section 1910 of the Mexican Civil Code (and section 1382 of the
French Civil Code) there is no distinction between intentional and
negligent conduct.69 For example, a defendant driving a car commits
the illicit act of hitting the plaintiff in the crosswalk as the plaintiff
crosses the street. The defendant is at "fault" regardless of whether
the defendant intentionally hit the plaintiff or negligently failed to no-
tice the plaintiff crossing the street.
In 1928, Mexican Civil Code section 1913 introduced for the first
time an additional theory of tort liability which is still in effect in
essentially its original form. 70 This additional form of liability focuses
exclusively on whether there has been injury due to the defendant's
use of a dangerous instrumentality. This theory, called "objective" or
"created risk" liability, abandons the Roman law tradition of looking
to "fault" as the source of civil tort liability. Under section 1913,
objective liability is quite similar to the common law notion of strict
liability, and in particular, strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. 7'
67. Mexican Civil Code § 1910 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
69. With respect to the distinction between delict and quasi-delict, Planiol says:
On closer analysis, there appears to be no reason for maintaining two distinct catego-
ries of the sources of obligations, both are illicit acts, both obligate their authors in
the same manner to repair the damage they cause. It would seem then that the
distinction should disappear, it not being founded on any practical difference.
PLANIOL, supra note 51, at 443.
70. Mexican Civil Code § 1913 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
71. Id.
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Section 1913 of the Mexican Civil Code provides as follows:
When a person makes use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatus
or substances which are dangerous in themselves, by reason of ve-
locity which they develop, their explosive or inflammable nature,
the strength of the electric current they conduct, or for other
analogous causes, he is liable for the damage he causes although he
does not act illegally, unless he proves that such damage was pro-
duced by the fault or inexcusable negligence of the victim. 72
Under section 1913, the defendant who hit the plaintiff crossing the
street will be held liable (unless the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent), regardless of whether there was civil fault, because the defend-
ant caused injury to the plaintiff by using a dangerous
instrumentality, a car.
73
Whether or not a plaintiff can recover for moral damage depends
upon whether or not the plaintiff must prove fault. Proof of fault is
required under section 1910, but is not required if the cause of action
is based on section 1913. Proof of fault is an essential prerequisite to
obtaining moral damages recovery.74
B. Mexican Law Civil Tort Recovery
Section 1910 of the Mexican Civil Code provides the fundamen-
tal basis for Mexican tort liability and recovery. 75  Most Mexican
scholars follow the civil law majority view that a plaintiff can recover
for "material" and "moral" damage. 76 This view is based on the fact
that section 1916 of the Mexican Civil Code 77 specifically refers to
moral damages.
The general rule for Mexican civil tort recovery is found in sec-
tion 1915, subdivision (1) of the Mexican Civil Code, which provides
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 1910.
75. "He who acting illegally or against good customs causes damage to another, is
obliged to repair it, unless he proves that the damage occurred in consequence of the fault or
inexcusable negligence of the victim." Mexican Civil Code § 1910 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
See also M. BORJA SORIANO, supra note 58, at 409.
76. M. BoRJA SORIANO, supra note 58, at 409, 428-30.
77. The statutory basis for the award of moral damages in Mexico is § 1916:
Independently of the damages and losses, the judge may grant in favor of the
victim of an illegal act, or of his family if the victim dies, an equitable indemnity as a
moral reparation to be paid by the person responsible for the act. Such indemnity
cannot exceed one-third (1/3) of the amount of civil liability. The provisions of this
article shall not be applied to the State in the case mentioned in Article 1928.
Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
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as follows: "The repair of the damage shall consist, at the election of
the injured party, in the restoration of the status previously existing,
when this is possible, or in the payment of damages and losses."
78
Section 1915, as originally enacted, was modeled after the French
Cour de Cassation's 79 interpretation of French Civil Code section
1382.80 According to the Cour de Cassation, section 1382 provided
recovery for "the damage, the whole damage and nothing but the
damage." '81 Originally, section 1915 of the Mexican Civil Code also
provided for complete reparation of loss to the victim, regardless of
the nature of damage suffered.
82
Section 1915 originally provided for two methods of reparation.
83
These were: (1) reparation by restitution, that is, restoration of the
item lost (exact reparation), and (2) reparation by providing compen-
sation equivalent in value to that which was lost. 84 Since the purpose
of section 1915 was to return the victim to the status quo ante, exact
reparation was the preferred method of reparation. Normally, the
plaintiff would only receive monetary compensation if it was impossi-
ble to provide exact reparation.
85
Section 1915, as amended in 1940, now contains two additional
subdivisions. Today section 1915, subdivisions (2) and (3), provide:
(2) When the damage is caused to persons and produces death,
total permanent, partial permanent, total temporary or partial tem-
porary incapacity, the amount of the indemnity shall be deter-
mined according to the provisions established by the Federal Labor
Law. To calculate the appropriate indemnity one shall take as the
base four times the minimum daily salary, which is the highest in
force in the region and shall be multiplied by the number of days
indicated in the Federal Labor Laws for each of the incapacities
mentioned.
(3) Credits for indemnity when the victim is a wage-earner are
78. Id. § 1915.
79. R. ROJINA VILLEGAS, supra note 55, at 130.
80. See supra note 36.
81. R. TOULEMON & J. MOORE, supra note 62, at 116.
82. The original version of Section 1915 read as follows: "The reparation of damage shall
consist in the restoration to the status existing prior to the damage and when this is not possi-
ble, in the payment of damages and losses." R. ROJINA VILLEGAS, supra note 55, at 130.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. A literal reading of this section as originally enacted allowed the Mexican courts to
follow the lead of the French Cour de cassation and to order the repair of "the damage, the
whole damage and nothing but the damage" without any distinction as to the type of injury
suffered by the victim. R. ROJINA VILLEGAS, supra note 55, at 130 n.17.
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not transferable and shall be paid preferentially in a single pay-
ment, except when otherwise agreed amongst the parties. The
foregoing provisions shall be observed in the case of Article 2647 of
this Code.8
6
Subdivision (2), in particular, changed the previous theory of
complete reparation. Today section 1915 provides for complete repa-
ration only when the illicit act causes damage to "things. ' s7 When
the injury is to persons, the amount of monetary recovery is limited to
the provisions established by the Federal Labor Law.88 An example
of the Federal Labor Law reads as follows:
In case of death of the worker, the indemnification to the persons
to which the preceding article refers shall be an amount equal to
the sum of seven hundred and thirty-five days of wages, without
deducting the indemnification received by the worker during the
period in which he was subject to the rules for temporary
disability.
8 9
This is why personal injury awards in the United States are often
much higher than Mexican personal injury awards.
Other factors contribute to the significant difference between
United States and Mexican personal injury awards. First, the absence
of a jury in the Mexican judicial system means that the judge alone
will hear and decide all aspects of the case. Second, most countries
which adhere to civil law principles, including Mexico, do not have
compulsory insurance, such as mandatory car insurance. Therefore,
there is no "deep pocket" from which to recover. In most cases, the
defendant will bear the entire financial burden of the award. Third,
punitive damages for tort liability are not permitted. Only a criminal
law judge can award punitive damages in Mexico. 90
C. Mexican Moral Damages
Most Mexican scholars agree with the civil law view that there
are two types of damage: "material" damage, also referred to as "pat-
rimonial" damage, and "moral" damage, also referred to as "extra-
patrimonial" damage. However, one of Mexico's best known legal
86. Mexican Civil Code § 1915 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
87. See supra text accompanying note 78.
88. Mexican Labor Law art. 502 (CCH) 227 (1974), quoted in Kozolchyk, Mexican Law
of Damages for Automobile Accidents: Damages or Restitution?, 1 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
189, 203 (1982).
89. Id.
90. See infra text accompanying note 99.
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scholars, E. Gutierrez y Gonzalez, strongly believes that moral rights
should be included as part of one's patrimony, rather than categorized
as extra-patrimony. 9- He therefore believes the Court should award
recovery for moral damages as well as for material damages under
certain circumstances.
92
Mexican Civil Code section 1916 specifically provides for recov-
ery for moral damages:
Independently of the damages and losses, the judge may grant in
favor of the victim of an illegal act, or of his family if the victim
dies, an equitable indemnity as a moral reparation to be paid by the
person responsible for the act. Such indemnity cannot exceed one-
third (1/3) of the amount of civil liability. The provisions of this
article shall not be applied to the State in the case mentioned in
Article 1928.
93
Section 1916 raises a number of important issues, such as: (1) whether
section 1916 requires a finding of material damage before moral dam-
ages recovery will be awarded; (2) whether moral damages recovery is
available only upon proof of fault committed by the defendant; and
(3) who is liable for moral damages recovery? These will be discussed
separately.
1. Whether section 1916 requires proof of material damage before
moral damages recovery will be awarded
Most Mexican scholars agree that section 1916 is literally consis-
tent with the civil law view that recovery for moral damage is recover-
able only if there is proof of material damage.94 However, most
Mexican scholars also agree that section 1916 should be amended to
allow moral damages recovery regardless of whether there is proof of
material damage.
95
The Mexican courts seem to share this view. The landmark case
Constructora Cross, S.A. 96 dealt with the issue of whether the father of
91. E. GUTIERREZ Y GONZALEZ, supra note 57, at 642.
92. Id.
93. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
94. M. BORIA SORIANO, supra note 58, at 428-30; E. GUTIERREZ Y GONZALEZ, supra
note 55, at 651.
95. M. BORIA SORIANO, supra note 58, at 428-30. "It is only objectionable in our view,
that the amount of the moral damage is limited to one-third of the material damage since this
appears to state that there is necessarily a relationship between patrimonial and moral damage,
which is completely inaccurate." R. BREBBIA, supra note 59, at 142 (translation by the
author).
96. Constructora Cross, S.A., 15 S/F 6a 4:290 (1958). Decisions of the Mexican Supreme
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a minor child killed by a truck driven by an employee of the defend-
ant corporation was entitled to recover for the death of his son even
though there was no proof of material damage. The defendant
claimed that since the minor was not employed and the father had not
been financially dependent upon him, there was no material damage
and, therefore, the plaintiff could not recover anything.
The Supreme Court of Mexico said that the theory that a father
cannot receive reparation for the death of his minor child because the
child did not contribute to the economic welfare of the family,
is devoid of any legal justification and is repugnant to the most
basic principles of justice. The greatest asset a father can have is
the life of a child and its death results in an obvious damage, that
goes beyond- because it has no limit-the notion of damage and
loss employed by the law to refer to the responsibility of one of the
parties for the breach of an agreed obligation. 97
The Court suggested that there should be recovery regardless of
whether the parents suffered material damage of financial loss. How-
ever, the Court did not go so far as to conclude that proof of material
damage is not required for moral damage recovery. The Court con-
strued the parents' loss of their son as material damage rather than as
moral damage. Nevertheless, the parents were still unable to recover
for their son's death as is explained in the next section. 98
2. Whether moral damages recovery is available only upon proof
of "illicit" conduct committed by the defendant
According to a literal reading of section 1916, the defendant's
conduct must be illegal. Section 1916 states that "the judge may
grant in favor of the victim of an illegal act. . . an equitable indem-
nity as moral reparation." 99
An act is illicit or illegal if there is proof of fault. Fault exists
when the wrongdoer has acted without right. The wrongdoer has ac-
Court are reported in the Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, created in 1870 and the only
authorized official publication of these reports. Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court are
the only court decisions that are regularly published. See Butte, supra note 18, at 807 n.5.
Professor Butte has created his own method of citing Mexican cases. This same method will
be followed throughout this article: volume number, followed by epoch number, followed by
part number, followed by page number. For example: 15 S/F 6a 4:290 means that the case is
in Volume 15 of the Sixth Epoch of the Semanario Judicial, on page 290 of the Fourth Part of
the volume. Id.
97. Constructora Cross, S.A., 15 S/F 6a 4:290, 296 (translation by the author).
98. See infra text accompanying note 101.
99. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980) (emphasis added).
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ted without right when his/her conduct is in violation of law or
against good customs. In other words, that conduct is immoral or
contra bonos mores.
In Constructora Cross, S.A. ,100 the Supreme Court of Mexico dis-
agreed with the trial and appellate courts' decision allowing recovery
for moral damages. The Court declared that moral damages recovery
can only be recovered from the person responsible for the "illicit"
act. 101
In other words, even if the Court in Constructora Cross, S.A. con-
cluded that there was proof of material damage, the plaintiff could not
recover for moral damages because the alleged cause of action was
premised on Mexican Civil Code section 1913.102 This code section
overlooks civil fault and presumes fault by imposing strict liability.
Conversely, section 1910 requires proof of fault. 10 3 If the plaintiff had
asserted a cause of action based on section 1910, he might have been
awarded a moral damage recovery.
Alternatively, a plaintiff could base his or her action on section
1913, which provides for "objective liability" for injury caused by use
of a dangerous instrumentality. However, the Court will not award
recovery for moral damages since the defendant's injurious conduct,
consisting of the use of a dangerous instrumentality which under
Mexican law includes the act of driving a car or flying a plane, nor-
mally is lawful.
Section 1913 relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving fault
because of the inherent danger of certain activities which the defend-
ant undertakes knowing full well that he is risking the safety of
others. In Constructora Cross, S.A., the Supreme Court of Mexico
held:
[S]ince in the present case there was no finding of any fault whatso-
ever on the part of the defendant corporation, nor was the accident
caused by mechanic [sic] defects of the truck, nor due to any other
causes attributable to the said corporation, the order [of the lower
court] directing the defendant corporation to pay moral damages is
in violation of sections 1910 and 1916 of the Civil Code and, there-
fore, the defendant is entitled to the constitutional protection it
100. Constructora Cross, S.A., 15 S/F 6a 4:290, 299-300.
101. Id.
102. Mexican Civil Code § 1913 (M. Gordon trans. 1980). See supra text accompanying
note 72.
103. Mexican Civil Code § 1910 (M. Gordon trans. 1980). See supra note 75.
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Mexican scholars have criticized the Court for this conclusion.
These critics claim there are no grounds which justify requiring proof
of illegal conduct in order to recover for moral damages while al-
lowing recovery for material damages regardless of whether or not the
defendant's conduct is legal or illegal. 105
Justice Garcia Rojas articulates this criticism in his dissent in
Constructora Cross, S.A. 10 6 He stated that the term "illegal conduct,"
as used in the Mexican Civil Code, was not intended to limit recovery
to instances where there is proof of fault. 10 7 According to Justice
Rojas, although the Mexican Civil Code occasionally refers to "negli-
gent" and "intentional" conduct as "illegal," this does not necessarily
mean that there must be proof of fault in order for there to be "illegal
conduct."' 1 8 Justice Rojas defines "illegal conduct" as any "conduct
done without right that causes damages or loss in someone's patri-
mony, whether intentional, whether negligent, or without proof of
either."' 0 9 Therefore, there is no need to determine whether the de-
fendant's conduct is intentional or negligent. All that is required is a
finding of damage. "[H]e who causes injury is acting illegally; it is a
fundamental principle of the law not to injure others." 110
For example, in an action for wrongful death caused by an auto-
mobile accident, the plaintiff cannot recover for moral damages be-
cause under section 1913 driving an automobile is a dangerous
104. Constructora Cross, S.A., 15 S/F 6a 4:290, 300:
Como en el caso concreto no se ha atribruido culpa de ningun genero a la sociedad
demandada, ni el atropellamiento se produjo por defectos del camion materialista o
por othas causas imputables a la propia sociedad, la condena a pagar el dano moral
que le impuso la autoridad responsable viola los ariculos 1910 y 1916 del Codigo
Civil por lo que por este concepto debe otorgarsele la protecion constitucional que
solicita.
Id. (translation in the text by the author).
105. E. GUTIERREZ Y GONZALEZ, supra note 55, at 651.
106. Constructora Cross, S.A., 15 S/F 6a 4:290, 303 (Garcia Rojas, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 303. "Es acto ilicito todo dano que se causa sin derecho a un patrimonio, haya
culpa, haya doo, o no los haya." Id. (translation in text by the author).
110. Id. at 305. "[Eli que produce un dano obra ilicitamente, es principio basico del der-
echo: no danar a otro." Id. (translation in text by the author). This approach is similar to the
one followed by the French courts.
[D]amage must be assessed in its entirety, independently of the fault committed; it is
only for the criminal judge to inflict a punishment. The judge in a civil proceeding
must award the total reparation of the damage caused by the fault, even if this fault is
minimal.
R. TOULEMON & J. MOORE, supra note 62, at 131.
Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L. J.
activity and fault is presumed. However, if the death is caused by a
horse and buggy, there will be recovery for moral damages since such
activity is not considered a dangerous activity. In the latter instance,
recovery will be premised on section 1920 which does not presume
fault. 1
In spite of Justice Rojas' strong dissenting opinion and scholars'
criticism, the Supreme Court of Mexico continues to deny recovery
for moral damages in actions based on section 1913 objective liability,
as seen in the cases that follow.
In Pensionarios Unidos del Suroeste de Jalisco, S.A. de C. V ,112
the plaintiff, spouse of the deceased victim, requested recovery for
both material and moral damages from defendant corporation for the
death of her husband. Plaintiff's husband was killed when an em-
ployee of the defendant corporation, while driving a company truck,
collided with the decedent's car. Plaintiff brought suit under section
1834 of the Civil Code of the State of Jalisco. At the time of suit,
section 1834 was identical to section 1913 of the Mexican Civil
Code. 1 3
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's award to the
plaintiff of recovery for moral damages. The Supreme Court's hold-
ing was based on a literal reading of section 1913 (section 1834), the
objective liability provision, and section 1916 (section 1837), the
moral damages provision. The Court reiterated "that the cause of
action founded on objective liability is independent from a finding of
legality or illegality of the facts that give rise to it."14 Therefore, repa-
ration for moral damages will only lie where plaintiff squarely bases
his or her action on section 1910 and there is a finding of fault on the
part of the defendant." 5
Although the plaintiff failed to expressly assert a cause of action
founded on section 1910, and based her action entirely on section
1913, the Court's decision was suspect since the plaintiff provided evi-
dence of the defendant's negligence." 6 In other words, the Court did
not make an independent finding of negligence on the part of the
driver (subjective liability under section 1910), although the plaintiff
introduced such evidence. The Court denied recovery for moral dam-
111. Constructora Cross, S.A., 15 S/F 6a 4:290, 303 (Garcia Rojas, J., dissenting).
112. Pensionarios Unidos del Suroeste de Jalisco, S.A. de C. V., 41 S/F 7a 6:83 (1972).
113. Id. at 99.
114. Id. at 106.
115. Id. at 105.
116. Id. at 106.
258 [Vol. 8:235
Moral Damages in Mexican Law
ages basing its decision solely upon section 1913 (objective liability),
which does not require proof of fault. 117
In Pensionarios Unidos del Suroeste de Jalisco S.A. de C. V , 18 the
plaintiff provided evidence that defendant's truck was loaded with
lumber protruding fifty centimeters from each side of the truck bed,
thus preventing vehicles from passing it on the extremely narrow
road. The protruding lumber violated section 105 of the Jalisco State
Traffic Ordinance. In addition, there was evidence that the truck had
stopped where the road curved, which also constituted a State Traffic
Ordinance violation."t 9 Justice Jose Abitia Arazapalo stated in his
dissent that the cause of action should be treated as based on both the
objective liability theory of section 1834120 of the Civil Code of Jalisco
and on Jalisco Civil Code section 1831,121 which provides for liability
based on fault and permits moral damages recovery. 122 He argued
there is no inconsistency or contradiction in asserting a cause of ac-
tion based on the objective liability of section 1834 and simultane-
ously asserting a section 1831 cause of action based on fault. "The
coexistence of the moral damage that arises from an illicit act and
objective liability, which, as is well known, is independent from a find-
ing of fault on the part of the wrongdoer. . . do not necessarily con-
tradict each other."' 123
The majority of the Court, however, did not elaborate on this
point, nor did it mention the possibility of recovery based on fault
(violation of statute).' 24 The Court might have decided in the plain-
tiff's favor if the plaintiff had founded her cause of action on section




119. Id. at 94.
120. Id. at 97.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 106 (Jose Abitia Arazapalo, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. This type of negligence is similar to the common law concept of negligence per se.
Prosser describes it as follows:
When a statute provides that under certain circumstances particular acts shall or
shall not be done, it may be interpreted as fixing a standard for all members of the
community, from which it is negligence to deviate. Within the limits of municipal
authority, the same may be true of ordinances.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 190 (4th ed. 1974).
125. In Wings, S.A. y Jesus Garcia Moreno, 75 S/F 7a 7:16 (1983), a case reported in the
latest Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, supra note 96, the Mexican Supreme Court, follow-
ing the reasoning of the dissent in Pensionarios Unidos del Suroeste de Jalisco, S.A. de C. V., 41
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In its decision, the Court did not mention that the truck driver,
either in his individual or employee capacity, should be held liable
based on "fault" and should compensate the plaintiff for moral dam-
ages. This may be due to the fact that the truck driver committed a
hit and run offense and could not be found at the time of the trial. 12 6
3. Liability for moral damages
Mexican Civil Code section 1916127 states that the judge may
grant moral damages "recovery to the victim of an illegal act and
such reparation shall be paid by the person responsible for the act.' 128
Therefore, only when there is a finding of illegal conduct or fault will
the judge consider awarding moral damages recovery. A majority of
civil tort cases involve actions based on section 1913 objective liability
in which the Court has consistently denied moral damages recovery
because objective liability does not require proof of illegal conduct.
The Court articulates its narrow reading of section 1916 in Con-
structora Cross, S.A .,129 Pensionarios Unidos del Suroeste de Jalisco,
S.A. de C. V 130 and in Octavio Gonzalez.'
In Octavio Gonzalez, one of the defendants violated a traffic ordi-
nance and hit the co-defendant's station wagon, which in turn injured
S/F 7a 6:83, stated that liability under Sections 1910 and 1913 of the Mexican Civil Code are
not mutually exclusive. In Wings, S.A. y Jesus Garcia Moreno the court in deciding an action
for wrongful death and personal injuries against the defendant corporation and its employee
driver, stated:
Subjective and objective liability, provided by Section 1910 and Section 1913 of the
Civil Code for the Federal District, are not mutually exclusive and can co-exist since
a person who makes use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatus or substances which
are dangerous in themselves, by reason of their explosive or inflammable nature, even
if not acting unlawfully, can in addition, perform illicit acts that can cause damage to
another person. Therefore, the plaintiff in a suit for civil tort liability can validly base
his cause of action on both these sections, so that the objection that they contradict
each other will not hold.
Wings, S.A. y Jesus Garcia Moreno, at 55-56 (translation by the author). Here, plaintiff had
based her action on both these sections and the defendant driver had been sentenced by the
criminal judge. However, recovery for moral damages was not at issue.
126. Pensionarios Unidos del Suroeste de Jalisco S.A., at 87.
127. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980) (emphasis added).
128. Independently of the damages and losses, the judge may grant in favor of the
victim of an illegal act, or of his family if the victim dies, an equitable indemnity as a
moral reparation to be paid by the person responsible for the act. Such indemnity
cannot exceed one-third of the amount of the civil liability. The provisions of this
article shall not be applied to the State in the case mentioned in article 1928.
Id.
129. See text accompanying supra note 96-98.
130. See text accompanying supra note 112-15.
131. Octavio Gonzalez, 15 S/F 6a 20:197 (1958).
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the plaintiff. Both defendants were found jointly liable under the ob-
jective liability section 1810 of the Code of Nuevo Leon, 132 which is
identical to section 1913 of the Mexican Civil Code. 133 The driver
who violated the traffic ordinance and hit the co-defendant's station
wagon, was ordered to pay moral damages recovery to the plaintiff.
The Court concluded that the co-defendant (whose station wagon was
hit) was not at fault because he did not create any risk of harm to the
plaintiff. The Court stated:
Section 1810 of the Local Civil Code, identical to section 1913 of
the Code of the Federal District, provides for objective liability for
the use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatus or substances po-
tentially dangerous, independently of whether damage is caused il-
legally, whether intentionally or negligently; that is, with respect to
the person who suffers the injury, the responsible parties are those
who cause it, for the only reason of having created the risk, and
therefore, are jointly liable for the damage caused, pursuant to Sec-
tion 1814. The determination of which of the responsible actors
was the direct or immediate cause of the happening of the risk is
totally irrelevant to the victim and should be a matter for the
wrongdoers to deal between themselves.' 34
In Quirina de Aquilar Vda de Nino135 the Supreme Court once
again denied moral damages recovery. There the plaintiff sued a bus
company (a corporation) and its insurer. The company owned the
bus in which plaintiff's husband had been a passenger and it had em-
ployed the driver of the bus. While maneuvering the bus down a
curvy road, the driver crashed into the center divider. Both the driver
and the plaintiff's husband died as a result. 36
The defendant corporation and its insurance company were both
found liable only for material damages because the suit was based on
section 1913. It is unclear from the opinion whether if the bus driver
had lived, he would have been liable for moral damages, since evi-
dence suggested the driver was at fault and lacked adequate train-
ing. 137 The Court stated:
Moral damages may only be recovered from the person who is lia-
ble for the illicit act as provided by section 1910 of the same code, a
132. Id. at 200.
133. Id.
134. Id. (translation by the author).
135. Quirina de Aguilar Vda de Nino, 2 S/F 6a 4:158 (1957).
136. Id. at 159-60.
137. Id. at 164.
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liability that is different from the object one prescribed by section
1913. In the case at bar, only the objective liability of the defendant
was proved by the use of a potentially dangerous mechanism, but
in the performance of a lawful activity as is the carriage of persons.
In order to subject the defendant to the payment of moral damages
it is indispensable to prove that the wrongful death of Jose Nino
Ruiz was due to an intentional act of the defendant company or to
a negligent act of the same, as for example, that the accident oc-
curred due to the lack of maintenance of the vehicle.' 38
The question remains whether the Court would have affirmed the
award of moral damages if the plaintiff had proved defendant at fault
for selecting an incompetent driver. There is no indication that such
an attempt was made in the case.13 9
In his strong dissenting opinion in Quirina de Aguilar Vda de
Nino,140 Justice Garcia Rojas points out that the Court should not
focus on whether there was an illicit act as defined by section 1910.14 1
Section 1910 broadly defines an illicit act as not only an act which is
against the law or good morals, but also includes any act which causes
physical injury. In addition, he stated that there is sufficient showing
of lack of training on the part of the driver and of the driver's fault.
Justice Rojas, therefore, agrees with the lower court's order directing
the defendant corporation to pay the plaintiff $1,600.00 (Mexican pe-
sos) as moral reparation.1 4
2
D. Moral Damages Versus Punitive Damages Recovery
As a result of the prerequisite proof of fault or illegal conduct for
moral damages recovery, some scholars believe that moral damages
recovery is the equivalent of punitive damages in American law. 143 In
138. Id. (translation by the author).
139. The plaintiff could have also pursued an action under Section 1924 which creates a
rebuttable presumption of fault or negligence in the selection or supervision of one's employees
who, while acting within the scope of their employment, injure others. Section 1924 provides a
theory of recovery which is separate and distinct from a 1913 cause of action which involves
use of a dangerous instrumentality. Section 1924 provides: "Managers and owners of mercan-
tile establishments are liable for the damages caused by their workmen or servants in the exer-
cise of their duties. This liability ceases if they show that in the commission of the damage no
fault or negligence can be imputed to them." Mexican Civil Code § 1924 (M. Gordon trans.
1980). See Butte, supra note 18, at 813.
140. Quirinia de Aguilar Vda de Nino, 2 S/F 6a 4:158 (1957).
141. Id. at 165-66 (Garcia Rojas, J., dissenting).
142. Id. See also Constructora Cross, S.A., 15 S/F 6a 4:290, 303-05 (Garcia Rojas, J.,
dissenting).
143. "Mexico's Supreme Court has drawn a sharp line between the entitlement to morals,
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actuality, moral damages recovery has nothing to do with the com-
mon law notion of punitive damages. Proof of fault (willful or negli-
gent conduct) is required in order to establish that the act was illicit,
not for the purpose of establishing motivation or malice. Moral dam-
ages recovery is not awarded for the purpose of punishing the wrong-
doer, although it does ultimately result in decreasing the wrongdoer's
assets. The purpose of moral damages recovery in civil law tort ac-
tions is to compensate the victim. 144
Unlike the distinction in tort liability between common law puni-
tive damages and civil law moral damages, in Mexican criminal law,
moral damage awards are much like the common law concept of pu-
nitive damages. Therefore under Mexican law, the court's approach
to resolving criminal disputes differs from its approach to resolving
civil tort disputes. In civil tort proceedings the court focuses on com-
pensating the victim. Whereas, in criminal proceedings, the court's
primary function is to punish the wrongdoer. This fundamental dis-
tinction between criminal and civil proceedings is derived from
French law. 145
It is only for the criminal judge to inflict a punishment. The judge
in a civil proceeding must award total reparation of the damage
caused by the illegal conduct [or fault] even if this fault is mini-
mal .... The function of the criminal judge is to order sanctions;
that of the civil judge is to make reparation. . . . In order to in-
sure complete reparation, the [civil] judge must not take into con-
sideration those circumstances that may increase or decrease the
degree of fault. 146
The Mexican scholar Rafael Rojina Villegas points out:
In the criminal proceeding, moral damages will be awarded even
without proof of material damage, since the former is not deter-
mined in function of the latter as unjustly required by section 1916
of the civil code. The amount of both moral and material damages
or punitive damages in actions based upon 'illicit' acts, i.e. willful or negligent torts and those
based upon the strict liability of dangerous mechanisms or instrumentalities." Kozolchyk,
supra note 88, at 206. Moral damages understood as punitive damages is also found in S.
BAYITCH & J. SIQUEIROS, CONFLICT OF LAWS: MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 149
(1968).
144. M. BORJA SORIANO, supra note 58, at 431.
145. Although Roman private law appears to have included a notion of punitive damages
in its concept of penal action, the drafters of the French Civil Code did not follow this ap-
proach. They left it up to the criminal judge to impose any sanction as punishment on the
wrongdoer as opposed to compensation for the victim.
146. R. TOULEMON & J. MOORE, supra note 62, at 131, 142.
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is left to the judge's discretion and the financial ability of the
defendant."
147
The erroneous equating of moral damage recovery with punitive
damages in tort actions may be a cause of a confusion with Mexico's
Penal Code. The Penal Code specifically refers to moral damages
when discussing punishment to the wrongdoer.1 48 However, moral
damages in the Civil Code are not punitive. They are limited to dam-
ages awarded as satisfaction to the victim.149
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL DAMAGES RECOVERY IN
MEXICO AND COMMON LAW DAMAGES
FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
A. Comparison Between Common Law Emotional Distress Recovery
and Civil Law "Affective Patrimony" Recovery
The concept of moral damages encompasses a broad range of in-
juries. It includes such injuries as harm to one's honor or reputation
or loss of one's personal freedom, which would normally constitute
common law defamation and false imprisonment, respectively.
The term "moral damages" also includes loss of, or interference
with, a variety of inherent rights; for example, the right to good
health, the right to the pursuit of happiness, and the right to be free
from interference with one's personal feelings and intellect.150 Inter-
ference with these interests involves injuries similar to those which
form the basis of common law emotional distress actions. This type
of injury, detrimentally affecting the plaintiffs feelings, is referred to
in civil law as "affective patrimony" damage. Moral damages recov-
ery is most frequently awarded for "affective patrimony" damage.
Mexican Civil Code section 1916 specifically provides for such
147. R. ROJINA VILLEGAS, supra note 55, at 129. See also R. BREBBIA, supra note 59, at
142. "The amount of reparation shall be determined by the judges in light of the damage that
must be repaired according to the evidence presented at trial." Codigo Penal Para El Distrito
Federal (Penal Code for the Federal District) § 31 (amended 1984).
148. Section 30 of the Mexican Penal Code for the Federal District provides in part:
The reparation of injury includes:
1. The restitution of the thing obtained because of the offense, and if this is not
possible, then the value of the same, and
2. Repair of the material and moral damages caused by the injury.
149. "Satisfaction is distinct from punishment since it concerns the injured person, not the
wrongdoer. While punishment inflicts a wound, satisfaction is intended to heal a wound."
Stroll, Penal Purposes in the Law of Torts, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 6 (1970).
150. M. BOIRA SORIANO, supra note 58, at 427-28.
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recovery. 15'
Although there is no equivalent common law term for "affective
patrimony" damage, the common law concept of infliction of emo-
tional distress comes the closest to the Mexican law notion of "affec-
tive patrimony."1 52 As previously mentioned, there are no distinct
"torts" in civil law. There is only the Law of Civil Tort. 153 There-
fore, it is unnecessary in Mexican civil law to establish whether the
conduct causing "affective patrimony" damage was negligent or in-
tentional. However, section 1916154 implies that there must be mate-
rial damage in order to recover for affective patrimony damage, just
as in many common law jurisdictions the plaintiff must establish
physical injury before he can recover for infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Section 1916 states that recovery for moral damage (which in-
cludes affective patrimony damage) cannot exceed one-third (1/3) of
the material damage. 155 Thus, absence of material damage precludes
moral damage recovery.
It is unclear why this limitation of moral damages recovery in
section 1916 was enacted. Mexican legislators may have intended to
adopt the view of numerous scholars that moral damages recovery
should not be awarded unless there is proof of material damage.
156
Also, they may have wanted to prevent flagrant abuse and unfair sub-
jectivity in awarding moral damages recovery. 57 Alternatively, these
legislators simply may have wanted to provide the judge with defini-
tive, somewhat objective guidelines of determining the amount of
moral damages recovery to be awarded.
There seems to be no indication in the treatises as to the exact
motivation for the wording of section 1916. However, both Mexican
scholars Rafael Rojina Villegas158 and Ernesto Gutierrez y Gonza-
lez159 believe that the Mexican legislature intended to adopt what is
called a "mixed theory" award for moral damages recovery which
151. See supra note 77.
152. "Moral damages," which include the things we would call pain and suffering,
mental anguish, loss of consortium and so on may be given to the victim, or to his
family if he dies, only if he is the victim of an illicit act, which the plaintiff must
prove and which brings the case under article 1910 instead of 1913.
Butte, supra note 18, at 814.
153. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 33, at 577 n.44.
154. See supra note 77.
155. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
156. See supra text accompanying note 94.
157. See supra text accompanying note 62.
158. R. ROJINA VILLEGAS, supra note 55, at 137.
159. E. GUTIERREZ Y GONZALEZ, supra note 55, at 651.
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allows an award for moral damage recovery, but makes such award
contingent upon a finding of material damage. 6° Mexican scholar
Manuel Borja Soriano states that "with respect to the second part of
Article 1916 of our Civil Code, it must be mentioned that there cannot
be an award of moral damages without a prior finding of material
damage."161
Consistent application of the "mixed theory" is hindered by the
wording of section 1916 and the fact that civil law judges are bound to
strict rules of interpretation of the codes.' 62 Judges are forbidden
from assuming the role of a legislator. 63 Therefore, normally, when
the meaning of a code is clear on its face, the literal meaning of the
code shall not be disregarded even though the spirit and intent of the
code arguably contradict the literal meaning of the code. 164 Since sec-
tion 1916 does not specifically provide for an independent cause of
action for intentional or negligent infliction of moral damages, courts
are unlikely to allow moral damages recovery independent of material
damage.
In order for the courts to consistently grant recovery for moral
damages, section 1916 must be amended such that: (1) the award of
moral damage recovery is mandatory and not permissive as it is now;
(2) moral damages recovery is available regardless of the legality of
the wrongdoer's conduct; (3) the award for moral damages recovery
does not require a prior finding of material damage; and (4) there be
no arbitrary limitation upon recovery to one-third of the material
damage. 65
B. Mexican Law Actions for Intentional and Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress
This section of the Article will discuss possible outcomes in Mex-
160. Id. at 647.
161. "En orden a la segunda parte del articulo 1916 de nuestro codigo Civil, hay que ob-
servar que no prodra haber indemnizacion de un dano moral si no acompana a un dano mate-
ral". M. BORJA SORIANO, supra note 58, at 432 (emphasis added) (translation in text by
author).
162. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
164. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980). See also R. SCHLESINGER,
supra note 21, at 514-15.
165. However, it is interesting to note that California has adopted this idea of a cap on
pain and suffering damages awards in medical malpractice cases. The ceiling placed by the
medical Injury Compensation Act of 1975 is $250,000. See Fine v. Permanents Medical
Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137 (1985).
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ican courts of various fact situations which under California law
would constitute actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In Accounts Adjustment Bureau v. Cooperman,166 decided July
22, 1984, the California Court of Appeals held that parents could as-
sert a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
against a psychologist who allegedly misdiagnosed their son's learning
disability, if the parents established the serious nature of the misdiag-
nosis. 167 In Cooperman, the parents took their son to a psychologist
for diagnosis and treatment of his learning problems. The psycholo-
gist misdiagnosed the child as suffering from DSMII non-psychotic
organic brain syndrome 309.9.168 The parents argued that a proper
diagnosis would have revealed that their son did not have any sort of
psychological problem, but was merely going through a typical child-
hood readjustment phase.
California courts follow the requirements set forth in Dillon v.
Legg169 in situations of non-impact injury 170 which is the situation
created by the facts of Cooperman. In these cases, in order to deter-
mine whether a plaintiff is entitled to protection from negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress the foreseeability of risk is the critical
inquiry. 17'
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,'72 the California
Supreme Court refined Dillon v. Legg for application of the non-im-
pact type case. 73 In Molien, the court defined Mr. Molien as a "di-
rect victim' ' 174 of the defendant's negligence, although he was not the
primary victim of the diagnosis. By defining the plaintiff as a "direct
victim," the court established that a duty was owed to the plaintiff
without showing that the plaintiff was foreseeable within the bounds
166. Accounts Adjustment Bureau v. Cooperman, 158 Cal. App. 3d 844, 204 Cal. Rptr.
881 (1984).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 848.
169. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
170. The factors delineated in Dillon with respect to foreseeability of risk are: (1) proxim-
ity of the bystander to the scene of the accident; (2) sensory and contemporary observation by
the bystander of the accident; and (3) closeness of the relationship between the victim and the
bystander. Id. at 740-41.
171. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 741.
172. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
173. The defendant physicians in Molien negligently misdiagnosed Mrs. Molien as having
syphilis. Mrs. Molien was advised to inform her husband of the diagnosis. The misdiagnosis
crated suspicion and tension in the marriage, eventually resulting in dissolution of marriage.
Mr. Molien sought damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
174. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23.
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set by the Dillon factors.17 5 The court also noted the difficulty in
drawing a line between physiological and psychological injury, and
concluded: "the attempted distinctions between physical and psycho-
logical injury merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of
proof; whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable
injury should not turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classifica-
tion scheme."' 176
Molien held that physical injury is not required for recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress as long as there is some
"guarantee of genuiness"' 77 found in the circumstances of the case.
Accordingly, Molien mandates that courts now leave to the jury ques-
tions of whether a plaintiff's claim is genuine and whether a defend-
ant's conduct caused the plaintiff serious emotional distress.17 8
Under Mexican law the analysis would be different. Fundamen-
tal civil law concepts help explain how a Mexican court would decide
the Cooperman case. The codes, in particular the Civil Code, being
the main sources of law, must be addressed at the beginning of any
analysis of a particular fact situation. 79 These codes are necessarily
general to encompass a broad range of circumstances. °80 The judge
must interpret these general statutes and by a process of deduction
apply the general law to the specific fact situation before him/her.' 8'
The specific sections of the Mexican Civil Code which apply in
the Cooperman case are sections 1910, 1915 and 1916.182 These stat-
utes pertain to tort liability damages and moral damage recovery.
Even though these statutes might not cover a particular fact situation,
section 18 of the Preliminary Provisions of the Civil Code states:
"[tihe silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law do not authorize
the judges or courts to refrain from deciding a controversy."'' 8 3 In
addition, section 19 of the same Preliminary Provisions states: "Ju-
ridical controversies of a civil nature shall be decided in accordance
with the letter of the law or its juridical interpretation. In the absence
of a law, they shall be decided in accordance with general legal princi-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 929-30.
177. Id. at 930.
178. Id.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 11-24.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 72 and 93.
183. Mexican Civil Code § 18 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
268 [Vol. 8:235
Moral Damages in Mexican Law
ples." 18 4 This latter section is frequently referred to by courts review-
ing lower court decisions because the party appealing the lower court
decision usually argues that the lower court erred in its interpretation
of the codes. 8 5 Section 1910 provides for subjective liability by saying
that "he who acting illegally or against good customs causes damage
to another is obliged to repair it .... ,"186 As previously mentioned,
there are no independent torts in Mexican law. There is only a law of
tort.'8 7 Since there is no independent cause of action for either inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, the only significant
issue is whether the victim suffered injury due to the "fault" of the
wrongdoer.
As in California, to recover for negligence under Mexican Civil
Code section 1910, the parents of the misdiagnosed child must prove
actual damages to the child and/or parents. 8 8 This is, of course, in
addition to establishing duty, breach, and causation. In Cooperman,
the child could allege that as a proximate cause of the negligent diag-
nosis by the psychologist, the child will be prevented from procuring
appropriate life and medical insurance and will also be precluded
from pursuing certain occupations in the future. The child's moral
damages, arguably, would consist of any detrimental impact caused
by the misdiagnosis on the child's ability to fully enjoy a normal
184. Mexican Civil Code § 19 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
185. This review is normally available by filing a "writ ofamparo." Amparo is a procedure
directed at challenging certain acts performed by the authorities in violation of rights recog-
nized by the Constitution of Mexico for the protection of nationals and foreigners. It is also
directed to the maintenance of the respect for legality by means of the guarantee of the exact
and accurate application of the law. During the 113 years which have elapsed since it was
incorporated in article 102 of the Constitution of 1857, amparo has evolved into a highly com-
plex and, in some respects, peculiarly Mexican institution performing three distinct functions:
(1) the defense of the civil liberties enumerated in the first twenty-nine articles of the Constitu-
tion; (2) the determination of the constitutionality of federal and state legislation; and (3) cau-
sation. R. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT 267
(1971). In the words of C. Schwartz:
The Amparo operates formally to protect the individual and social rights guaranteed
by the first twenty-nine articles of the Mexican Constitution, the 'Bill of Rights.' But
because of modem statutory and judicial interpretation of articles fourteen and six-
teen of the constitution, the writ may extend to violations of other constitutional
limits on governmental activity as well. Article fourteen permits district courts to
enjoin officials who fail to follow essential formalities of procedure and statutes issued
prior to the controversy. Article sixteen requires officials to demonstrate the compe-
tency of their authority and the legal basis and justification for the action taken.
Schwartz, Rights and Remedies in the Federal District Courts of Mexico and the United States,
4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 67, 72 (1977).
186. See supra text accompanying note 67.
187. See supra text accompanying note 34.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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life. 189 However, in order for the parents to recover damages, most
likely a finding of material damage to the parents would be a
prerequisite. 190
In contrast to California case law, Mexican courts do not distin-
guish between physical and non-physical injury.191 Therefore, proof
of foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, which is required in Califor-
nia courts in order to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of care, would not be required in a case like Cooperman in Mexi-
can courts. Additionally, since the prerequisite factors set forth in
Dillon 192 are not required in Mexican law, lawsuits are arguably more
prone to fraudulent claims. One way Mexican courts can guard
against fraud, abuse and unfairness is in limiting the award for the
moral damages recovery. Section 1916 limits these awards for moral
damages to one-third of the award for material damage.'
93
Another way the Mexican courts guard against fraudulent or
abusive claims is to only award moral damages recovery "in favor of
the victim of an illegal act, or of his family if the victim dies. . .."194
Unless the victim dies, section 1916 clearly only allows the victim of
an illegal act to recover moral damages. Therefore, only the child in
Cooperman could recover moral damages under section 1916. Never-
theless, as the California Court of Appeals points out in Cooperman, it
is difficult to envision a two-year old child suffering from emotional
distress caused by the misdiagnosis of a psychologist. The parents are
the ones who are more likely to suffer emotional distress from the
misdiagnosis of their child.' 95
Even if the Mexican court concludes that the child's difficulty in
pursuing certain types of occupations and obtaining medical and life
insurance constitutes moral damage to the parents, the court still
might not award the parents moral damages recovery. Section 1916
189. However, the broad interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Mexico to the term
"patrimonial damage" in Constructora Cross, S.A., 15 S/F 6a 4:290, may indicate a willingness
to allow recovery for damages even if under the label of "patrimonial" (material) instead of
extra-patrimonial (moral).
190. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980). See supra text accompanying
note 93.
191. Instead, Section 1916 of the Mexican Civil Code seems to require a prior finding of
material damage. See supra text accompanying note 93.
192. See supra note 170.
193. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980). See supra text accompanying
note 93.
194. Id.
195. Cooperman, 158 Cal. App. 3d 844 (1984).
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does not specifically provide that parents (nonvictims) can recover
moral damages for harm suffered by their child.196 However, section
19 of the Preliminary Provisions of the Mexican Civil Code specifi-
cally states that the judge must decide judicial controversies "in ac-
cordance with the letter of the law or its juridical interpretation."'197
This means the court must consider whether awarding moral damages
recovery to the parents would result in reversal by the Supreme Court
of Mexico due to such award constituting a mistake of law or misin-
terpretation of the law. In a civil law country such as Mexico, a judge
would be accused of usurping legislative functions were he or she to
extend the award of moral damages recovery to the parents under the
facts of Cooperman.
The only way the parents could recover for moral damages, other
than by amending section 1916, is for the court to conclude that sec-
tion 1916 is inapplicable. There would then, arguably, be a gap or
lacuna 198 in the law codes and the court could award moral damages
recovery to the parents pursuant to section 19 of the Preliminary Title
which provides that in the "absence of law," the court may decide a
case "in accordance with general legal principles."'' 99 In order to de-
termine what are the applicable relevant "general legal principles, ' ' 200
the court will look to the writings of both Mexican and civil law
scholars. It will also, usually, consider the decisions of the highest
courts of Mexico and other civil law countries; in particular, the
French Cour de Cassation.
If Molien2°l had been decided by a Mexican court pursuant to
Mexican law, the plaintiffs husband probably would not recover
moral damages compensation from the doctors who negligently mis-
diagnosed his wife as having syphilis, for the same reason the parents
in Cooperman would not be able to recover for moral damages. The
196. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980). See supra text accompanying
note 93.
197. See supra text accompanying note 184 (emphasis added).
198. See supra text accompanying note 19.
199. Id.
200. There is disagreement as to the meaning of "general principles of law" in the different
codes. During the 19th Century, (when codification began) it was believed that these princi-
ples derived only from positive norms of a given national system, thus sharply differentiating
the "general principles" from natural law. In recent years, "general principles of law," are
found in the enacted law and also outside of it. See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 21, at 602-03.
See also R. DAVID & J. BRIELEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 114-18
(1968).
201. 27 Cal. 3d 916.
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delegation by the California Supreme Court to the trier of fact of the
duty to determine the genuiness of a claim and whether there is relia-
ble proof of serious injury202 cannot be accomplished under Mexican
law since there is no jury.
In Slaughter v. Legal Process and Courier Service20 3 a process
server improperly served the plaintiff by merely dropping a copy of a
complaint in the plaintiff's mailbox while the plaintiff was away on
vacation. The process server then signed a sworn affidavit of personal
service on plaintiff Slaughter. Based upon this affidavit, a default
judgment was entered against the plaintiff. In an action by the tenant
against Legal Process and others alleging, inter alia, intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the California Court of Ap-
peals denied defendant's summary judgment motion only on the issue
of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
2 °4
If Slaughter had been decided by a Mexican court under Mexi-
can law, the Mexican court very likely would have awarded to the
plaintiff moral damages. The court would reason that the plaintiff
was the victim of the defendant's wrongful conduct and suffered ma-
terial damage (eviction) as a result of the improper service of process.
The plaintiff in Slaughter might also possibly recover moral damages
compensation from the defendant based on the civil law theory of
abuse of right.20 5 According to this theory, conduct which is per se
lawful may20 6 become illegal and therefore constitute a civil tort if the
conduct constitutes an abuse of right, which in turn constitutes
"fault. ' 20 7 If there is "fault" or an "illicit act," the court can award
moral damages recovery. However, moral damages recovery based
on this reasoning has not yet been argued before the Mexican courts.
This is strange since section 1912 of the Civil Code expressly provides
202. The court in Molien stated that in emotional distress cases when proof of mental
distress is not of a medically significant nature, "the jurors are best situated to determine
whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct caused emotional distress, by referring to
their own experience." 27 Cal. 3d at 930.
203. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1236, 209 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1984).
204. Id. at 1251.
205. For a good understanding of the civilian notion of abuse of right, see Gutteridge,
Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22 (1933).
206. That is, the owner of a house erected a tall dummy chimney on his roof for the sole
purpose of annoying a neighbor by depriving him of the access of light to certain of his rooms.
Although this owner was doing something that he had an absolute right to do (lawful per se),
the French Cour de cassation held the act to be wrongful as an abuse of right. Gutteridge,
supra note 205, at 32.
207. PLANIOL, supra note 51, at 477.
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for a cause of action for abuse of right. 20 8
The abuse of rights theory of recovery for moral damages might
also be used in instances involving section 1913 strict liability. 20 9 As
has been explained, 210 this section does away with the requirement of
fault, making the legality or illegality of defendant's conduct irrele-
vant as long as it is dangerous, and, thereby, precluding moral dam-
ages recovery. However, since a finding of abuse of right carries with
it the element of fault (whether intentional or negligent) an argument
can be made in favor of a moral damages award even under a strict
liability theory as provided by section 1913. 2 11
Finally, the fact situation described at the outset of this Article
should be examined. A widow of a California resident has a cause of
action against a Mexican airline for the wrongful death of her hus-
band who was seriously injured while vacationing in a Mexican re-
sort. The outrageous conduct of the airline in refusing to fly the
injured man to Los Angeles raises the possibility of a moral damage
award.
The plaintiff could base her action on section 1913212 (objective
liability) since an airline, like an automobile, is considered a danger-
ous instrumentality. Fault or negligence by the airline will be pre-
sumed and the court will order the airline to pay damages. However,
the widow will not be able to receive an additional amount as recov-
ery for moral damages. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff bases her
cause of action on section 1910213 (subjective liability) it is very likely
that she will be able to prove illegal conduct by the airline on the facts
mentioned. This is also one of those few instances in which a cause of
action for immoral conduct, or contra bonos mores, may be successful,
especially if the plaintiff manages to prove monopoly on the part of
208. "When in the exercise of a right, damage is caused to another, there is an obligation
to indemnify such damage, if it is proved that the right was exercised merely for the purpose of
causing the damage, without profit to the owner of the right." Mexican Civil Code § 1912 (M.
Gordon trans. 1980).
209. See supra text accompanying note 72.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
211. See supra text accompanying note 72. This appears to be a novel approach to the
problem in strict liability actions. Mexican scholars have not discussed this possibility. Tradi-
tionally the theory of abuse of rights was confined to intentional and malicious acts that caused
damage without benefit to the actor. Only recently has this theory been extended to negligent
abuse of a right. See Bolgar, Abuse of Rights in France, Germany and Switzerland: A Survey of
a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine, 35 LA. L. REV. 1016, 1020 (1975).
212. See supra text accompanying note 72.
213. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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the airline.2 1 4 Assuming that causation is not at issue, there will be a
finding of fault and very likely the court will award her recovery for
moral damages. An analogy to the reasoning employed by the
Supreme Court of Mexico in Constructora Cross, S.A., 21 5 demon-
strates that plaintiff suffered "material damage" by the loss of her
husband. In that case, the Court discussed what the death of a minor
son meant to a father even though the son did not as yet have an
income. Therefore, whether or not plaintiff depended on her deceased
husband for support is irrelevant. 216
The airline would be "the person responsible for the act" under
the theory of respondeat superior as provided by section 1924 of the
Mexican Civil Code.21 7 If the victim dies, the widow would qualify as
family218 entitled to an equitable indemnity as moral reparation.
V. CONCLUSION
Tort liability in civil law countries generally, and in Mexico in
particular, developed from historical and legal concepts different from
those of the Anglo-American tradition. The characterization of this
discipline as the "law of tort" in opposition to that of the "law of
torts" leads to sharp conceptual differences in the approach to tort
liability in civil law versus common law. The emphasis on liability
based on fault in contrast to strict liability also accounts for some of
the conceptual differences between the two legal systems. This liabil-
ity based on fault does not distinguish conceptually between inten-
tional and negligent conduct: either one will trigger fault or illegal
conduct under the system.
This approach is totally different from a common law analysis
with respect to a cause of action for intentional tort and the analysis
that is required in dealing with a cause of action based on negligence.
Thus, different results as to liability and damage awards may be easier
to understand. The lack of juries, the unsophisticated insurance laws
and limitations in the amount of the awards contained in the statutes
214. See supra text accompanying note 18.
215. See supra text accompanying note 96.
216. See supra text accompanying note 97.
217. "Managers and owners of mercantile establishments are liable for damages caused by
their workmen or servants in the exercise of their duties. This liability ceases if they show that
in the commission of the damage no fault or negligence can be imputed to them." Mexican
Civil Code § 1924 (M. Gordon trans. 1980).
218. Mexican Civil Code § 1916 (M. Gordon trans. 1980). See supra text accompanying
note 97.
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also explain differences in the amount of damages awarded. Addi-
tionally, the strict concept of separation of powers in Mexico that pre-
vents a judge from creating law hampers the ability of the judges to
decide novel issues in areas like negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
With respect to moral damages, the clearly marked role of the
judge in a civil proceding as that of ordering damages to provide satis-
faction to the victim, in contrast to the role of the judge in a criminal
proceeding, who orders damages as punishment to the wrongdoer, ini-
tially explains the absence of punitive damages in tort liability.
This difference in roles between the civil and criminal judges in
turn results from the Roman distinction between public law and pri-
vate law. This division of the law is also expressed in the strict con-
cept of separation of powers that is followed in Mexico and most civil
law countries. The statutory scheme that places a limit to the amount
of moral damage and requires a finding of material damage further
explains the absence of punitive damages in tort law.
All the considerations point to a marked difference in the area of
damage award for tort liability between Mexican law and American
law. At a time in which much is heard about crisis in our tort system
and a need to restructure our insurance laws, it may be useful to learn
about the experiences of our neighbors and that of other legal systems
in order to arrive at a more realistic determination of damage award
for liability in tort.
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